【論文】Understanding Paradigms and Polarity in International Relations by Paul Horness
Understanding Paradigms and Polarity in International Relations
16（155）
International Relations is a broad field with importance in understanding world 
politics. People without background knowledge often become frustrated that 
world issues, such as the Middle-east conflict, are complicated and unresolvable. 
The unrelenting cacophony of information makes it difficult to distinguish be-
tween the superficial and substantial. In the first part of this paper, the major 
paradigms of international relations are briefly outlined in order to give those un-
familiar with international relations the basic theories of international relations so 
that they can orientate themselves to the different theoretical perspectives. In 
addition, it is hoped that by limiting the number of theories to four, readers will 
be able to identify and understand the different theories, so that they can distill 
information more easily and apply them to real world events more readily. It is 
also hoped that the explanations will encourage readers to delve more deeply 
into the theories and discover the intricacies of them and to help the reader for-
mulate their ideas more soundly. In the second part of the paper, the concept of 
polarity, a core idea in International Relations, will be explained. Polarity is a per-
vasive concept used in international relations and is an essential tenet of the 
most prominent paradigm. In the third part of the paper, polarity will be exam-
ined through the lenses of each paradigm. As polarity is often treated as a sepa-
rate issue, by comparing the concept across the four paradigms, it is hoped that 
the readers can understand how the concept is used. In the fourth section, a typi-
cal example of a realist argument will be given. It is intended to demonstrate the 
most common arguments from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold 
War. In the final section, current thinking and issues will be examined. It is 
hoped that the readers will be able to see how the different theories have adjust-
ed to the end of the Cold War and how they are adjusting to the current situa-
tion in international relations.
Paradigms
There are four common paradigms to view international relations: Realism, 
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Liberalism, Marxism, and Constructivism. Realism simplifies the complex world 
by assuming states seek security above all else. Realists view states as sovereign 
actors seeking to establish and maintain themselves. Therefore, the international 
structure is a self-help system in which each state seeks means to protect itself 
against other states. In a self-help system, considerations of state security subor-
dinate economic gain to political interests （Waltz, 1979）. Although the system is 
anarchic in that there is no supra-government beyond an individual state, states 
do recognize commonality, and that facilitates cooperation. States recognize, how-
ever, that power is distributed throughout the system unequally. Therefore, 
states cannot rely on ‘global policemen’ to uphold law and order; thus, they use 
balance of power among themselves to insure survival and peace. As McKinlay 
and Little （1986） pointed out,
To establish an international society, therefore, the realist recognizes that it 
is necessary to reconcile two conflicting conditions. One is the demand by 
states for equality, a condition which is inherent in the idea of sovereignty 
and independence. The other is the recognition that states possess very un-
equal power capabilities, generating differential capacities to defend bound-
aries and pursue interests. The realist relies upon two main mechanisms to 
reconcile, though not eliminate, these conflicting conditions. The first is reci-
procity, which encourages states to deal with each other on an equal footing, 
and to search for common interests. The second is balance of power, which 
can, to some extent, accommodate power differentials in a way which does 
not lead to a state of nature. It provides the setting where reciprocity can 
flourish （p. 82）.
Realism assumes the nature of the international system is adversarial and states 
need to actively protect their national interests.
A second common paradigm to view international relations is called liberalism. 
Unlike realism, liberalism does not limit the international system to states’ capa-
bilities. Rather, liberalism includes a plurality of actors such as multinational com-
panies or non-governmental actors, to influence state behavior where preferences 
vary from state to state. It also takes into account the internal politics of a coun-
try and how internal politics manifests itself outwardly in the international arena. 
At its basis, liberalism’s goal is the promotion and protection of freedom, both po-
litical and economic. According to Moravcsik （1992）, liberalism has three core as-
sumptions in international relations. First, the fundamental actors in world poli-
tics are individuals and privately-constituted groups with autonomous 
preferences. Second, governments represent subsets of domestic actors. Finally, 
behavior between states is shaped primarily by preferences, not power. Taken 
Understanding Paradigms and Polarity in International Relations
18（153）
together, liberalism focuses on the individual to participate freely in both the po-
litical arena and economic market, thus promoting an interrelated social dynamic 
that benefits not only the individual, but also those that share in the relationship.
Marxism is the third common paradigm in understanding international rela-
tions and it rejects the realist and liberalist paradigms in two basic ways. First, 
inequality is not inherent to the system. Both realists and liberalists accept in-
equality as a natural element to the system whereas Marxists claim inequality is 
an outcome of the system. Second, the basis of power is not the military; rather, 
it is economics because the wealthy capitalists created the state system to insure 
their wealth. Military power is an outgrowth of a desire to protect the economic 
system of wealth. The present institutions have been designed to encourage in-
equality, and therefore they eliminate any chance for structural change neces-
sary to implement social equality that would lead to other forms of equali-
ty （McKinlay & Little, 1986）.
A fourth common paradigm in viewing international relations is called con-
structivism. Contrary to liberalism and realism, constructivism looks at how so-
cial interactions create perceptions, and these perceptions continually change 
based upon further social interaction. Over time though, social interaction be-
comes social practice, thus the unit of analysis is neither the state nor the indi-
vidual, but the results of social interaction over time. Wendt （1992） argued that 
his goal was to build a bridge between the realists who focused on the structure 
of international relations （anarchy） and the liberalists who focused on the process 
of international relations （individual freedom）. He does not deny realism’s claim 
of a self-help system, but rather he denies the conclusion drawn by the realists 
from the self-help system. Anarchy does not necessarily imply a security dilem-
ma to the state as assumed by the realists. In addition, constructivism frees up 
the liberalist’s notion of individual change. By examining the intersubjective un-
derstanding and expectations between an institution and individual, constructiv-
ism can show how an institution influences individual behavior, which is a prob-
lem for liberals epistemologically. The meanings constructed from political, 
economic, and cultural norms determine state behavior （Wendt, 1999）. For exam-
ple, Canada and China view America’s military strength very differently; it is not 
the material fact of the weapons but how they are perceived by different actors 
that affects international events.
Polarity
As described in the preceding theoretical paradigms, none of viewpoints con-
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sider the distribution of power to be equally apportioned throughout the interna-
tional system. As a result, the nature of power distribution in the international 
system changes over time. Throughout history political power has been distrib-
uted into three types of systems: Unipolar, bipolar and multipolar. Although the 
criteria for distinguishing between these systems are not clear-cut, they are usu-
ally related to military and economic power. These different systems basically re-
flect the number of powerful states vying for power and their hierarchical rela-
tionship. In addition, these systems assume that each pole is of comparable 
strength. That means that the two states in bipolarity are roughly equal in 
strength （e.g. the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War） ; or 
the states in multipolarity are roughly equal in strength （e.g. the great powers of 
Europe prior to WWI）.
In a unipolar system, one state has the most political, cultural, economic and 
military power. According to Monteiro （2011）, a unipolar system is defined by 
three characteristics. First, unipolarity is in an inter-state system, which implies 
the existence of several states. Second, as there are several existing states, a uni-
polar state is significantly constrained by anarchy, which means that it cannot 
completely control the other states. Unipolarity is different from a hegemonic en-
tity because a hegemonic state is able to control the foreign policies of other 
states. Third, unipolarity obstructs the international system's usual tendency to-
wards power balancing. Unlike in bipolar and multipolar systems, there is no sys-
temic balance of power in a unipolar system because the strongest state is too 
powerful to meaningfully balance against it.
The bipolar and multipolar systems share the same basis in that one state does 
not hold predominate power, and therefore the states must balance the power 
between them. The bipolar system reflects two dominant states with less power-
ful states allying with either of the two superpowers. The system reflects the 
idea of a zero-sum game in that if one superpower gains, then the other necessar-
ily loses. Bipolarity allows two states to control all conflicts in the international 
system of order. Often the Cold War is used as a representative example of the 
bipolar system.
The multipolar system has been the most common throughout history with the 
time period around World War I as an oft-cited example. The multipolar system 
usually reflects many equally powerful states vying for power. It differs from the 
bipolar system in that these states can change their relationship via other states 
without necessarily gaining or losing power.
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Paradigms and Polarity
As it might be expected, polarity is interpreted differently by each paradigm. 
Mainly due to theoretical positions, however, realists use polarity, as in balance of 
power, to explain international relations more than the other paradigms. Interest-
ingly, realists disagree among themselves as to the effect of polarity. Some real-
ists, based on Morgenthau （1948/1985）, argue that a multipolar system is more 
stable than a bipolar one, whereas other realists, based on Waltz （1979）, argue 
that a bipolar system is more stable. Morgenthau uses the following logic to 
make his argument. Politics is like human nature in that states continually lust 
for power, just as humans continually look to dominate one another. If there are 
only a few number of states, then that means states will have fewer constraints 
to overcome, and thus more likely to create conflict. If there are more states, con-
flict is less likely because a state will have more states to contend against. Waltz, 
however, uses the following argument. A state is concerned about its capabilities, 
not its intentions. If there are fewer states, then conflict is less likely because the 
states can focus on the other’s capability and adjust accordingly. If there are few-
er states, then measuring another state’s capability relative to one’s own is easier. 
These realists also argue that unipolarity is a threat to peace because states will 
join together to limit the greatest state’s power. Thus, unipolarity is a transition 
to multipolarity. Recently though, even that tenet has been challenged within the 
realist group.
Liberalists see polarity as an extension of their paradigm. As stated earlier, lib-
eralists focus on the individual and the state is a reflection of a group of individu-
als with ideals. States therefore build alliances to share in these ideals. As 
Moravcsik suggests （2006）, the international order is not unipolar, nor can it ex-
ist. Even multipolarity is a misnomer because it fails to capture the interdepen-
dence and interconnectivity brought about by globalization. Liberal institutions 
are far more ranging than the concept of polarity because states outside of the 
liberal international order can still benefit from its existence （Ikenberry, 2011）.
Although they use different reasons, both Marxists and constructivists argue 
against the very notion of polarity. Marxist scholars perceive the emphasis on 
state relationships in the international order as a way of obscuring the fundamen-
tal dynamics of class relations in a global setting. Only by understanding the 
movement of global capital can a state’s behavior make sense （Sinclair, 1996）. For 
constructivists, Wendt （1999） argues that polarity obscures the interdependent 
relationship states have with each other. He outlined three versions （Hobbesian, 
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Lockean, and Kantian） of how a state could interpret the international order 
based on the relationship with other states. In the Hobbesian version, a state sees 
other states as an enemy and therefore conflict is perpetual and violence is the 
norm. In the Lockean version, a state sees other states as rivals. That is to say 
state sovereignty is accepted and other states are not necessarily considered en-
emies. In the Kantian version, a state seeks friendship and mutual aid from other 
states so that peace can become the norm. The key point of international order is 
how a state interprets other state behavior to determine their own.
A Heuristic Process
The purpose of this section is to elucidate some advantages and disadvantages 
of polarity through the realist paradigm. This example might be how a realist us-
ing Waltz’s （1979） ideas might argue that a bipolar system is more stable than a 
multipolar one, and that alliances in a bipolar system deter war more effectively 
than in a multipolar system. The advantages and disadvantages of each system 
are addressed. Starting with bipolarity, one advantage of stability is there are no 
peripheral powers that can control or conflict with two states' interests because 
they lack the strength to tip the balance in favor of one superpower or the other. 
Hence, the philosophy of massive retaliation between the states is a logical con-
clusion, because one state's gain is the other's loss. Massive retaliation works as 
an advantage to bipolarity, because each state has incontestable power through 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Other advantages of bipolarity are outflows 
of the first. Two states cover a broader range of power in the system that allows 
them to gain leverage and control conflicts. Since the superpowers can control 
conflicts, they manage low-level crises effectively. Even if a conflict recurs con-
stantly, the superpowers can suppress it enough so that it does not affect their 
survival. Low-level conflicts are not escalated by the superpowers because war 
would eliminate one of the states, which is counter to their security. The final ad-
vantage of bipolarity is that states need only to analyze their own power. Since 
the two states do not use allies as a means to increase power, they do not need 
to fear that one of their allies will defect （contrast this with the steps Germany 
took to prop up their ally, Austria-Hungary, prior to WWI）. Hence, internal eval-
uations are done to measure capabilities that lessen uncertainty and miscalcula-
tion of the adversary's strength or intentions. The result is fewer major wars and 
more stability.
The prominence of conflict is a disadvantage of bipolarity. There are only two 
states competing for power, and therefore, their confrontation is a zero-sum 
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game. There is constant pressure to retain power in a bipolar system because 
the loss of any substantial power threatens a state's survival. Perhaps the most 
disturbing disadvantage of bipolarity is the maxim that peace is best served by 
the threat of mutual destruction!
The advantage of multipolarity is the constant moderation among multiple 
states （i.e., greater than two） of power. Interaction between several states de-
creases the intensity of conflict by eliminating the zero-sum game. The advan-
tage of multipolarity is short lived though because of its disadvantage that it can-
not maintain stability. There are more states constantly striving to advance their 
own security. The more these states struggle with each other, the greater the 
chance of conflict. Each state must analyze several different states to determine 
its proper level of security. Interestingly, with the advent of nuclear weapons, 
state survival and security can be secured relatively easily, thus allowing a state 
with such capacity to engage other forms of power. Haas （1970） argued that bipo-
larity tends to produce less frequent, but longer wars than multipolar systems. 
Multipolarity produces more wars with more countries involved and more casu-
alties than any other system. Therefore, Haas argues, since no system can eradi-
cate war, bipolarity tends to be more stable than multipolarity.
Why do states form alliances? According to Kenneth Waltz （1979）, "alliances 
are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. The 
common interest is ordinarily a negative one, fear of other states" （p. 166）. Mili-
tary, political, economic, and geographical are other common interests, but these 
interests are used to enhance the alliance, not to form the basis of the alliance.
In bipolar system and multipolar systems, alliance leaders try to maximize the 
contributions received from other states. Since military interdependence among 
allies is not necessary in a bipolar system, leaders' strategies are more flexible. 
The gross inequality between the two superpowers over the other states in the 
alliances makes any realignment insignificant. It is unlikely that any alliances will 
cause a war in a bipolar system because of the superpowers' military capability. 
In an alliance among unequal states, the superpower leaders do not need to wor-
ry about the unfaithfulness of their allies for two reasons. First, the weaker allies 
do not get to choose the alliances scheme, rather, the superpowers do. Second, 
superpowers can quickly reinforce the alliance with negative or positive incen-
tives. Although concessions are made to allies, neither superpower will alter its 
strategy nor change its military disposition in order to prevent an ally defecting. 
Therefore, alliances in bipolarity are less likely to lead to a war between the su-
perpowers, because changes in alliances do not alter the balance of the two su-
perpowers.
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In a multipolar system, alliances made among equals necessarily mean that the 
defection of one state will threaten the security of other states. Since all states 
wish to avoid domination by another state, states may not cooperate together 
even though it is in their best interest. According to Olson （1971）, the collective 
good may be attained by several parties that interact with one another. One par-
ty, however, may wish the other parties to interact with one another to attain 
the collective good. Thus, that one party will still benefit from the collective good, 
but it does not have to interact with the other states. If the other parties dis-
agree and do not interact to attain the collective good, then all the parties lose. 
Thus, multipolar systems must rely upon the group to attain their security. How-
ever, the logic that they will cooperate to achieve security may not be true. 
Therefore, flexibility and decision making freedom is severely constrained in a 
multipolar system of alliance. Alliances in a multipolar system are more likely to 
lead to war, because the security of the state is harder to attain.
During the Cold War, outlining the advantages and disadvantages of bipolarity 
like these was common. Now that the Cold War is over, these arguments do not 
seem to be persuasive because realists believed that a bipolar system would not 
end. Furthermore, as the argument would lead you to believe, unipolarity （our 
current system, in which the United States is the only true superpower） was 
originally expected to just be a transition stage to multipolarity （e.g. with the 
United States, Germany, Russia, Japan and China and comparable powers）, and 
therefore international relations presently should be less stable. However, the 
world has changed in ways which challenge this expectation.
Current Thinking
Realists
The Cold War is over and the most prominent paradigm, realism, has been 
challenged in numerous areas as to why the theory could not predict the end of 
the Cold War and why multipolarity has not supplanted unipolarity. Realists ac-
knowledging the limits to their theory have incorporated different approaches, 
but the main focal point has been to include ideas beyond a state’s capability and 
the state’s desire to maintain balance of power. One group of realists （Rose, 1998; 
Wohlforth, 1993） sought to make the theory more rigorous by including a state’s 
internal decision-making process to its foreign policy agenda. Although the inter-
national system reflects a state’s power, the inadequacy of theory was that a 
state could not judge another state’s capability well enough. This led to state be-
havior that did not maintain the balance of power in the system because the 
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state was constantly underestimating or overestimating its capabilities, and 
therefore this led to unwanted conflict. By incorporating a state’s internal deci-
sion-making process through the distribution of power in the international sys-
tem, the theory can explain a state’s foreign policy decision. As Wohl-
forth （1993） noted,
Perceptions of power are more dynamic than measurements of material rela-
tionships. Rapid shifts in behaviour may be related to perceived shifts in the 
distribution of power which are not captured by typical measures of capabili-
ties. The relationship of perceptions to measurable resources can be capri-
cious and unfortunately discovered only through historical research （p. 294）.
Another group of realists also incorporated perceptions into the theory by add-
ing another level of analysis to the theory. Bull （1977） argued that a great power 
is not defined solely by its capabilities, but also its perceived power. He intro-
duced this distinction by outlining the difference between an international sys-
tem and an international society. His concept of an international system is the fol-
lowing:
A system of states （or international system） is formed when two or more 
states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on 
one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave - at least in some measure - 
as parts of a whole” （p. 9）.
Whereas his concept of an international society is the following:
A society of states （or international society） exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in 
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of 
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of com-
mon institutions （p. 13）.
The benefit of including the distinction between these terms is that realism can 
now incorporate an appropriate framework where not only military and econom-
ic capabilities, but also social factors can be accounted for. By examining the 
common social institutions, realism can now plot out how stability and order 
might occur over time when a state’s power might not be able to explain it.
Liberalists
At the end of the Cold War, liberalists could argue that the democracies of the 
world were able to defeat communism through shared democratic values. 
Through the international institutions created after WWII, such as Bretton 
Woods Conference creating the International Monetary Fund （IMF） and Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development （IBRD）, and in 1948 the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade （GATT, which evolved into the WTO）, liberal-
ists were able to argue that interdependence based on shared values was what 
dictated relations in the international system. Unfortunately, the invasion of Iraq 
by the United States in 2003 led to a divide between its European allies, such as 
Germany and France, that opposed the regime change through military means. 
Public opinion within democracy is important because it is the collection of indi-
vidual opinions that dictate policy. As public opinion in Europe was not in favor 
of the war （USA Today）, how did the United States get support for the war? 
The United States also ignored the United Nations lack of support for the inva-
sion. The Iraq war is problematic for liberalists as they cannot explain the United 
States actions in seeking a regime change through undemocratic means, or 
through pursuing these means in the face of opposition from their liberal demo-
cratic allies.
Marxists
As the focus for Marxists is the inequality of power that the wealthy use 
against the non-wealthy, the end of the Cold War has not changed the interna-
tional system. The Cold War was about threats to capitalists’ businesses, and the 
Gulf Wars after the Cold War were similarly just about the capitalists insuring 
their access to oil. The present international system supports wealthy capitalists 
and the military is used to protect the economic system. According to world-sys-
tem analysis （Wallerstein, 2004）, a sophisticated form of IR-focused Marxist theo-
ry, the world economy is integrated into a single capitalistic system that includes 
three levels of hierarchy: the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The core zone 
accumulates its wealth at the cost of the peripheral zones, and therefore the core 
holds the power that induces the periphery to supply the necessary raw materi-
als at low costs. This unequal relationship is stabilized through the structure of 
international relations. Over time the world-system of capitalism will overcome 
cultural differences and be the only remaining system because it focuses on the 
accumulation of capital and political power at the expense of social development.
Constructivists
As many constructivists analyze international relations by looking at the social 
reality through a state’s goals, threats, fears, cultures, and identities, they have 
gained credibility after the Cold War. Since the realists could not explain why 
the Soviet Union did not adhere to the fundamental systemic rule of state securi-
ty and survival, constructivists argued that states could change identities and 
transform their roles in the international system. Wendt （1992） stated that the 
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Cold War could end if the United States and Soviet Union did not perceive each 
other as enemies. Due to a variety of societal factors, such as Soviet Union’s in-
ability to maintain itself with the West’s economic, political, or technological de-
velopment, the Soviet Union dissolved itself. In addition, the West sent overtures 
to the Soviet Union that it would not invade and encouraged its new policy of 
Perestroika （Snyder, 2005）. Constructivists argue that relations among states are 
not limited to a state’s military power and the system is not inherently struc-
tured so that balance of power is maintained. As their ontological and epistemo-
logical positions differ from realists and liberalists in that international system is 
determined by the interaction between the social interpretation of the world and 
the state’s material capability. A state’s power does exist in a vacuum. It has to 
have the material resources as well as the social capability to use power.
Conclusion
This paper outlined four common paradigms of international relations, polarity, 
and the interconnections between the two ideas. Although the explanations were 
meant to capture the ideas in the broadest terms, there are layers and intricacies 
within each paradigm that blur the distinctions between them. Much of the dif-
ference between them is the assumptions made about the underlying structure 
of the international system. By understanding the differences, one can see the ar-
guments more clearly as they are guided the basic tenets of the paradigm. Cur-
rently where does the theory of international relations stand? How can the theo-
retical framework of international relations help us understand the new 
international order? These questions are just the tip of the iceberg, but more im-
portantly one needs to understand that the different theoretical perspectives can 
help bring clarity in understanding today’s events. Slaughter （2011） sums it best 
by concluding,
While various theories may lead to more or less compelling conclusions 
about international relations, none is definitively ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Rather, 
each possesses some tools that can be of use to students of international poli-
tics in examining and analyzing rich, multi-causal phenomena （28）.
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